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In Argentina,  changes  in tax legislation,  tax administration,  and
individual  taxpayers' attitudes  toward  tax  evasion  improved  tax
revenues.  Here is a method  to measure  how much.
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Too often,  a good tax policy proposal  is consid-  *  The admin;strative  dimension  of tax reform
ered sufficient  to improve  the tax system  - too  is at the heart of Argentina's  recent fiscal
little consideraticii  is given  to weaknesses  in tax  adjustment.  Since 1991,  tax effort is an average
administration,  perhaps  because  of measurement  80 percent  higher  than during the preceding
problems.  Analyzing  legal and administrative  (temporary)  successful  adjustment  period (under
measures  and quantitatively  evaluating  their  the Austral Plan).
impact  on tax revenues  is generally  arduous.
*An  efficient  tax ad:;.nistr~tion  and an
Morisset  and Izquierdo  develop  a simple  improvement  in taxpayer  compliance  levels
approach  to assessing  how tax effort affects  tax  appear  to precede rather  than follow increases  in
revenues  (performance).  By "tax effort"  they  tax revenues.
mean  changes  in tax legislation  (except  changes
in nominal  taxes),  tax administration,  and  * Tax effort  is influenced  significantly  by
individual  taxpayers' attitudes  toward  tax  such  macrovariables  as GDP growth  and infla-
evasion.  Changes  in tax administration  include  tion, as well as by political (in)stability.  It is
increasing  tax penalties,  new technologies,  and  influenced  less by such fiscal variables  as
administrative  reform.  altemative  sources  of financing.
They measure  tax effort as a residual:  the  * In Argentina,  the sequence  of the tax effort
variations  in tax revenues  that cannot  be ex-  was, first, to broaden  the potential  value-added
plained  by changes  in economic  variables  and  tax base, and then to reduce  tax evasion  through
tax structures.  Using  this approach,  one can  higher  tax penalties  and improvements  in the
easily  identify factors  that influence  tax revenues  basic functions  of tax administration  (inspection,
over timne,  and understand  the behavior  of tax  audits,  tax management,  and personnel  policy).
revenues  in developing  countries,  particularly
where  macroeconomic  conditions  are  volatile.
The authors  apply this approach  to Argen-
tina; it can as easily be applied to other countries.
Their main conclusions  in this application:
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1.  The objective of this paper is to assess the contribution of tax effort to tax revenue
performance.  Tax effort, used in a  somewhat  unconventional  way, includes changes in tax
legislation (except the changes in  nominal taxes), in  tax administration and in  individuals'
attitudes toawrd tax evasion.  Although the imnportaiace  of administrative reform is widely
acknowledged  by those concemed with tax reform  in developing  countries, this issue has been
relatively  little explored in the economic  literature,  perhaps reflecting  measurement  problems.
2.  Changes in tax administration, ranging from incrasing  tax penalties to technological
progress and administrative reforms, would require careful analysis of a myriad of legal and
administrative  relationships. It would  be even  more arduous to evaluate  quantitatively  the impact
of these actions on tax revenues. An alternative  approach  is developed  in this paper; tax effort
is viewed as a  residual; i.e.  the variations in tax revenues that cannot be explained by the
changes in economic  variab'-s and in tax structure. The major benefit  from this approach  is that
the factors that influen_e tax revenues  can be easily identified over time, and provides a good
understanding of  tax  revenues behavior in  developing countries, particularly with  volatile
macroeconomic  conditions.  This approach has been applied to Argentina, but can be readily
applied to other countries as well.
3.  The major conclusions can be  summarized as  follows.  First,  the  administrative
dimension of tax reform is at the center of the recent fiscal adjustment in Argentina.  Since
1991, tax effort is on average  80 percent higher than during the precedent (temporary)  successful
adjustment episode (the  Austral Plan).  Second, an  efficient tax  administration and  an
improvement  in taxpayers compliance levels appear to precede rather than to follow increases
in tax revenues.  Third, tax effort is influenced  significantly  by macrovariables  such as GDP
growth and inflation as well as by the stability  of the political environment, but relatively less
by other fiscal variables such as alternative  sources of financing. Finally, the sequencing  of tax
effort in Argentina was, first, to  broaden the potential VAT  base, and,  then, to  reduce tax
evasion through  higher  tax  panalties and  improvements of  the  basic  functions of  tax
administration:  inspection  and audits, tax management,  and personnel policy.INT(?UCTION
In the economic literature on taxation, policy reveals little concern for weakness in tax
administration.  A  good  tax  policy proposal  and  technological progress  is  thought to
unambiguously improve the tax system.  However,  administrative  constraints may prevent the
establishment  of an optimal tax system, particularly in countries suffering from a scarcity of
trained administrators.  "In shon,  there may well be too much preoccupation  with what to do
and too little attention to /how  to do it" (Bird, 1992, p.189).
The objective  of this paper is to assess the contribution  of changes  in tax administration
to the evolution  of tax revenues. The virtual abs._nce  of studies on this issue may reflect both
conceptual  and measurement  problems. Changes  in tax administration,  ranging from iicreasing
tax penalties  tc technological  progress and administrative  reforms,  would  require careful analysis
of a myriad  of legal and administrative  relationships. It would  be even more arduous to evaluate
quantitatively  the impact of these actions on tax revenues.  For these reasons, an alternative
approach is developed  in this paper.  The effect  of economic  variables  such as inflation  and GDP
growtl:, and changes  in tax structure  on tax revenues  is distinguished  from the impact of changes
in tax administration  and in the taxpayers  behavior. These two last factors,  defined as tax effort,
are viewed as a  residual; i.e. the variations in tax revenues that cannot be explained by the
changes in economic  variables  and in tax structure. The major benefit  from this approach is that
the factors  that influence  tax revenues  can be easily identified  over time.
The approach is applied to the case of Argentina. One of the prominent  features of the
Argentine tax system  is the high volatility  of total tax collection. Abrupt changes from year to
year reflected  increases or decreases in the level of economic activity, in the rate of inflation,
tax  rates, in  taxpayer compliance levels, and  tax administration efficiency.  The approach
developed  in this paper will place the administrative  dimension  of tax reforn at the center of the
success of the current adjustment  program.  During the 1989-92  period, tax revenues  incrmased
by more than 200  ,  rcent in Argentina. Using simple procedures, we will show that changes
in tax effort are likely to have  preceded rather than followed  tax revenues  variations.  We will
also attempt to identify the economic  and political variables that influenced  tax effort as welJ  as
the channels used by the Argentine  Government  to increase tax effort.
The paper proceeds  as follows. In Section 1, we identify  the main factors  that inAuence
tax revenues fluctuations  by developing  a simple approach to measuring tax effort.  In Section2
2, this approach is applied to the case of Argentina. In Section 2. 1, the contribution  of different
factors, including  tax effort, to tax revenues  fluctuations  are measured over the 1983-92  period.
Section 2.2 di--usses the issue of the causal relationship  between tax effort and tax revenues.
In Section 2.3,  we attempt to identify empirically the variables that have influenced tax effort
in Argentina over the last decade. In Section 2.4, we focus on the microeconomic  aspect of the
tax reforms implemented  during the 1989-92 years  in assessing  to which extent the improvement
in tax effort was due to a  reduction in tax evasion or  in tax exemptions.  We also  review
changes in the enforcement  regime and loopholes, and then tax administration  itself.  Finally,
Section 3 contains our conclusions.
1.  A SIMPLFIED  APPROACH  TI  MEASURING  TAX  EFFORT
The purpose of the approach is to identify the main factors that influence tax revenue
fluctuations. In particular, we need to elaborate  on the meaning of tax effort in the context of
the paper, as this concept is used in a somewhat  unconventional  way. As a starting point, tax
receipts collected by the tax administration  can be defined as:
(1)  Tt = tB,
where T, is tax revenue  collected  at time t by the administration,  t, the average  nominal tax rate,
and B, the tax base.
Since the inflation  rate may be high and very volatile, the Olivera-Tanzi  effect should ba
included in equation (1).  As suggested  by Olivera [1967] and Tanzi [1978], tax revenues are
influenced negatively  by the rate of inflation given that taxes are collected with a certain lag.
Following  these authors, tax revenues can be expressed as follows
(2)  T, =  t, [ B*,/[(l +  Og)(l  +  07r,)]J
where B*t  is the potential  tax base, e the estimated  delay in collection (days/month  ratio), & the
growth  rate of the tax base and x, the inflatior.  rate.
Equation (2) states th, t tax r'venues depend on the average  tax rate and the potential tax
base adjusted for the Olivera-Tanzi  effert  Using this equation, we can determine the factors(3) OlnT, =  CMnt,  +  n1nB*, - Cln(I  +  eg) - nln(l  +  07r)
The percentage change in  tax  reverut;  depends on  the  percentage changes in  the
theoretical  tax base, on the average  nominal  tax rate, and on the Olivera-Tanzi  effect.
Equation (3) can be used to derive changes  in the theoretical  tax base, which is the only
variable not directly observable.  Moreover,  assuming that the variations in the tax base are
attributable  to changes in economic  activity or in tax administration,  we can write the following
equation:
(4)  nInB*,  =  ndnY,  +  nlnE,
where CMnY,  is the percentage change in the tax base owing  to var.ations in economic  activity.
Substituting  equation (4) into equation (3), the percentage  change in tax cffort equals (nlnE):
(5) CAnE, =  n1nT, - nlnt,  +  C-ln(I +  egj  +  cln(1  +  er,j - n1nY,
The percentage  change in tax effort is therefore  defined  as the change in tax revenues  that
is not explained by va-.ations (i) in nominal  tax rates; (ii) in the Olivera-Thnzi  effect; and (iii)
in the tax base due to changes in economic activity. The variable nLnE, is assumed to reflect
important  changes  in tax legislation (except  the changes  in nominal taxes), in tax administration
and in individuals' attitudes toward  tr-- evasion.  In Section 2.4,  the variations in nTnE, due
to changes in the tax base are distinguished  from the other effects. 2 While the results of such
a  simple accounting approach should be  interpreted with  care,  they nevertheless offer a
framework  in which to appraise comparative  tax effort over a period of time.
2  See footnote  10, for further details.-4-:
2.  AN EMIRICAL  ANALYSIS  OF TAX EFFORT  E  ARGENTINA
2.1  Estimation of 2x  Effort (1983-92)
rTe approach developed  in the precedent section was applied to the case of Argentina
over the 1983-92 period.  After the poor performance  of  ihe  Argentine tax system during the
1980s, tax revenues increased significantly  from 12.7 percent of GDP in 1989 to 22.5 percent
of GDP in  1992.  One of the major achievements  has been unamtiguously the surge in VAT
revenues  from 0.6 percent of GDP in the second quarter of 1989 tl  9.2 percent of GDP in the
fourth quarter of  1992 (Figure 1).  While part of this increase was due to  more favorable
macroeconomic conditions,  improvements in  tax  administration and  tax  legislation also
contributed  to this positive evolution.
Tl  assess the contributions of these diff-  rent factors on tax revenues, the percentage
variations  of th,e  main components  derived from equation  (5) were calculated  during the 1983-92
period on a monthly basis.  Without  loss of generality,  we concentrated  on the value-added  tax
(VAT),  equivalent to about 60 percent of total tax revenues. 3 While the complete results are
presented in the Annex, the results obtained  by using this methodology  are illustrated  in Table
1 for the  stabilhzation  periods June  1985-Septermber  1986 (Plan Aus.ral) and March  1991-
December 1992  (Convertibility Plan).  VAT receipts increased  significantly during both
episodes, but the monthly tax effirt was 80 perc,.nt higher during the Convertibility  Plan than
during the Austral Plan.  In contr. st, if the decline in the inflation mte through the reversal of
the Olivera-Tanzi  effect accounted  for an important  part of the transitory success of the Austral
Plan (explaining 30 percent of the total tax revenue increase), this effect was almost negligible
during the Convertibility  Plan.  It has to be recognized, however,  that about 12 percent of  he
increase in VAT  receipts observed during the Convertibility  program was due to the increase
in the general VAT  rate from 16 percent to 13 percent in March 1992.
The evolution  of the tax effort index (1983  = 100; see technical appcndix) over the 1983-
92 period is illustrated in Figure 2.  During 1987-89,  the deterioration  in tax effort by about 75
percent was a major reason for lower tax revenues in Argentina.  The capacity to administer
3  Note,  however,  that the irapact of the tax structure reform  (e.g.elimination
of distortionary  taxes such as  import taxes or stamp tax) on the efficiency
of the tax system is excluded from this analysis.- 5 -
efficient taxes was eroded by inattention to  management  and systems development, frequent
legislative  changes and the imposition  of new levies greatly complicated  the work of the General
'Tax  Board (DGD),  resulting  in the accumulation of inconsistent  bureaucratic procedures.  The
change of Government  in July 1989 produced an unprecedent  improvement  in tax effort --716
percent between  the second  quarter of 1989  and the tourth quarter of 1992. Tax effort increased
particularly at the beginning of 1990 and during the first two quarters of 1992, in smuite  of a
temporary  decline during the first quarter of 1991. As discussed  in greater detail in Section 2.4,
these improvements occurred in  stages, beginning with the  broadening of the  tax base  in
Febnrary and November 1990.
Losses  in  tax  receipts owing to  the  Olivera-Tanzi  effect also  contributed to  the
fluctuations  in tax revenues (Figure 3).  As expected,  the negative i.npact on tax revenues was
significant during  periods  of  high  inflation, reaching its  highest piunt  during  the  two
hyperinflations  of 1989-90. The negative  impact of inflation  was also quite important during the
months preceding the Austral Plan  (June 1985).  Not only was the domestic inflation rate
extremely high, but the collection delay was estimated above 35 days (see Duran 1987).  The
fiscal reform package  of mid-February 1990 required VAT  and income-tax  payment;  to be made
within 10 days, thus reducing  the collection lag.
2.2 The Causal Relationship  Between  Tax Effort and Tax Revenues
The administrative dimen'ion  of the  tax  reform -xplains to a  large extent revenue
increase since March 1991.  In absence of such effort, the increase in tax revenues observed
during the Convertibility  Plan would have been limited to 34 percent --much lower than the
observed increase of 108 percent or even the increase in VAT  collection registered during the
Austral Plan.  The purpose of this section was to determine whether tax administration reforms
preceded or  followed variationq  in tax revenues.  The geneally  accepted opinion is that an
increase in tax revenues  generated  by a good tax policy proposal improves  the efficiency  of tax
administration.
Tb determine the causal relationship between tax effort and tax revenues, we used the
well-known Granger test with an optimal distributiun lag including 9 lagged variables. 4 The
results are summarized  in Table 2.  The hypothesis  of Granger causality from tax effort toward
4  Corresponding to a -'hite-noise  error  distribution.-6 -
tax revenues cannot be rejected because the parameters of lagged tax effort appear jointly-
significant  at a 10 percent level (as shown by the F-stalistics in lhble 2).  On the other hand,
we did not find Granger causality  from tax revenues  to iax effort.  Reg, 1rdless if this test defines
properly the concept of causality, it is important for at least two reasons.  First,  it indicates
some prediction  capacity of changes in tax effort in forecasting  future variations in tax revenues.
Second, the absence of Granger causality from tax revenues  to tax effort allows us to reject the
hypothesis  that variations  in tax revenues  precede changts in tax effort.
2.3  rm  inants of Tax Effort
Since changes in tax effort are likely to precede rather than follow the variations in tax
revenues, it is imporant  to determine the economic and political variables which can aff6
changes in tax effort.  Bird (1992) and Richuptan (1987) argue that macroeconomic  variables
are  important in  explaining taxpayers cormpliance  and the efficiency of  tax administration.
However, the influence of macroeconomic variables on tax effort (or tax evasion) has been
relatively little explored in the economic literature.  The behavior of taxpayers can be viewed
as ar. attempt  to adjust their satisfaction  or lack of satisfaction  with government  services and the
macroeconomic  environment, but the existing literature has only focused its attention on the
explanation of the behavior of taxpayers in terms of micioeconomic factors (see Richuptan
(1987) for a review of this literature).  Assuming  that risk-averse taxpayers  want to maximize
their expected utility (Allingham  and Sandmo (1972)) or their expected income (Srinivasan
(1973)), t6- effect of microeconomic  factors --including tax rates, tax base, the probability of
being detected and penalized, and the  size of  the penalty-- on tax evasion is discussed. 5
However,  this approach is difficult  to test empirically  because most of the explanatory  variables
are not directly observable.
rax effort is  also influenced by the  fiscal authorities's decisions (as well as  by the
bargaining process  between these  authorities and  taxpayers).  One  popular  approach to
understand the fiscal behavior  of the public sector is t'  ssume that it reflects the actions of a
5  Other  factors such as the characteristic  of the population --age,  sex,
educational background-- have also been explored.set of public decision makers (e.g. Heller (1975)).6  Within this framework, tax effort would
positively  respond to an increase in public expenditures  because the Govemrnments  would have
to  adjust its buidget constraiut.  Alternatively, additional sources of  financing will reduce
incentives to  increase tax  revenues.  Finally, the efficiency of  tax  administration and the.
taxpayers  con.pliance levels ire closely related to the stability  of the political system.
Foll wing the above arguments,  the empirical  analysis  of the responsiveness  of tax effort
has been limited to three classes of explanatory  variables.' First, we tested fiscal variables:  real
public expenditures,  the variation in mral  net extemal public financing ((lnF),  the variation in
MI  (nlnM)  as a proxy of public monetary financing,  an;l a dummy variable (DUMI) used to
test the assumption that the prohibition of moneta%y  financing during the Convertibility  Plan
exerted  a positive impact on tax effort.  Second, we introduced macrovariables:  GDP growth
(GROWTH)  and inflation (INFL); and, finally, indicators of political stability: the number of
months  between each change in the office  of the Minister (POL) and a dummy  variJV.e  (DTJM2)
capturing  the change of Administration  in the third quarter of 1989.
OLS regressions were carried out over the 1983:I-92:IV  period, the most significant
results are reported in Table 3.  Additional  comments  can be found in th'- text. 8 Vi; expressed
the variables  in percentage  variation rat..r  than in levels  to eliminate  the trend, and used lagged
explanatory  -ariables because these variables  and tax eifort are likely to be jointl,  determined.
Although it is difficult to obtain stable relationships  in a country like Argentina, the overall
estimated results appear quite satisfactory as  summarized  by the  explanatory power of the
6  Basically,  public decision makers are assumed to maximize their  utility
taking into account uses of public resources and alternative  sources of
financing such as effort in taxation and borrowing.  The maximization  of
this utility function with respect to current policy variables subject to the
public sector budget constraint predicts that tax effort is related  positively  to
public expenditures and negatively to other sources of funancing.
7  The analysis  remains of course partial since changes in tax effort  partially
reflect the reality of political power and mnultiple  aspects of the society  such
as the degree of corruption and the degree of civic conscience.
8  The procedure  used in this paper differs from other studies in that the
dependent  variable is tax effort rather  than total tax revenues.  Using tax
effort,  the influence of macroeconomic variables through the Tanzi effect
and  changes in the potential VAT base is controlled for,  implying  more
reliable  tests of the impact of externaJ factors.- 8 -
regressions (adjR 2)  and the white noise behaviour of the residuals tested for autocorrelation
(Lagrange  multiplier test), heteroskedasticity  (due to squares of the regressors) and normality
(Jarque-Bera  test). 9
Tax effort appears significantly  influenced  by the political and economic environment,
but little by other fiscal variables. The response of tax effort to past inflation appears to be
positive and significant. This result is somewhat  surprising because, from the taxpayers'  point
of view, an increase in the inflation  rate is perceived  as a policy failure that would encourage
future tax evasion.  However,  it may indicate that the destabilizing  impact of inflation  on the
public sector's budget during the 1980s'°  forced the authorities to improve tax administration
or to increase the tax base.  Higher lagged  GDP growth influenced  positively tax effort through
an increase in economic welfare  and lower liquidity constraints as well as higher confidence  in
the fiscal sector performance.  It is worth underscoring  that the relative high elasticity of tax
effort to GDP growth accentuates  the effect of changes in economic activity on tax revenues:
a decline in GDP growth, say from 6 percent to 2 percent, would, other things equal, reduce
total VAT  revenues by about 8 percent through its direct impact on the potential VAT  base and
its indirect effect on tax effort.
The stability of the political envitonment  also affected positively tax effort as captured
by the variable (POL); this suggests  that, other things equal, an additional year of political
stability  would increase tax effort  by 6 percent. The positive impact associated  with the change
from President Alfonsin to President  Menem (DUM2) partly reflects the sharp decline in tax
effort registered during the last few months of the Alfonsin  Administration  when the morale of
the tax administration staff was extremely  low. External and monetary financing  appear to have
influenced  negatively  but not very significantly  tax effort during the obselved period, suggesting
that access to alternative soL'rces  of financing may reduce incentives to  increase tax effort.
Along the same lines, we found a strong positive relationship  between the Convertibility  Plan
and tax effort (DIJMI).  1l
9  The results of these  tests are available  upon request from the authors.
10  See Beckerman  (1989) or Rodriguez  (1991)
11  Although  the estimated  impact  of a variation in public  expenditures is not
reported in Table 3, the insignificant  coefficient  may be the result of
opposite forces.  On the one hand, it may reflect the negative influence  of
(continued...)2.4 The Administrative  Aspect
We were interested in  the  specific means and the sequencing used by the Menem
Administration  to deal with the shortfall of the tax system since 1989.  To provide insights on
the  strategy followed by the  Menem Administration, tax effort was separated between the
measures aimed at  reducing tax  exemptions and  tax evasion.  This  was done by  slightly
modifying the framework presented in Section 1 (see Appendix for further details)' 2. Figure
4  illustrates the  strategy followed by  the  Menem Administration.  First.  the  authorities
accentuated  their efforts on the coverage  of the VAT  base through legal actions as the potential
VAT  base increased by more than 40 percent, while tax evasion effort only increased by 15
percent from the third quarter of 1989 to the first quarter of 1991.  Then, from March 1991
onwards, they focused their attention on tax evasion by increasing  their effort by 129 percent
rather than on the VAT  base that increased only by 4 percent.
Tax Exemptions
It is well recognized  that the high level of (legal) tax exemption  in developing  countries
is one of the major factors explaining  the low level of collection  (see Bird, (1992)).  At the end
I 1(...  .continued)
higher public expenditures  on the taxpayer willingness to pay,  an expansive
fiscal policv is generally  viewed as a bad policy,  raising the marginal utility
derived from an extra-dollar  of tax evasion.  On the other hand,  an
increase in public expenditures  might lead to higher tax effort because the
authorities  might be  compelled to respect their budget constraint.
12  Accordingly,  the potential tax base (B*,) can be rewritten as:
B*,  =  (cr,Y)X,
where ca, is the percentage of GDP covered by the VAT,  Y, is GDP and X,
an index representing  the remaining effort in tax administration(ie  the tax
evasion reduction effort).  Rewriting this equation in log difference and
substituting into equation  (4) presented  in Section 1, the variation in tax
effort (CE,)  can be expressed  as:
nInE,  =  Ilncx, +  nlna.,
where  OIna,  represents  the changes  in exemption reduction effort and
nILX,  the changes in tax evasion reduction effort.- 10-
of the 1980s, Argentina  was no exception  to this rule as the potential VAT  base' 3 was estimated
at 52.2 percent of GDP, much lower than the potential VAT  base in  Europe averaging 60
percent during the 1980s. Over the last two years, the legal coverage  of the VAT  was increased
dramatically  by a series  of legal actions including  the elimination  of exemptions  for combustibles
and foodstuffs  in February 1990, improved  controls  of the industrial  promotion regime in April
90 (and a  further tightening in  December 92), and the  inclusion in  the VAT base of most
services in November 1990.  Previously,  the VAT  had been applicable only to those services
specifically  listed in the law; the new law contains the few exemptions. Finally, the potential
VAT  base was extended to water supply services in March 1991 and to insurance services in
February 1992.  Overall, VAT coverage is estimated to have increased from 52.2 percent in
1989 to almost 80 percent of GDP in 1992.
Tax Evasion
The Menem Administration  fought with strong sanctions  and a larger tax administration
capacity tax evasion.  Tax penalties were increased through the reactivation of existing and
newly created legal capacities to  enforce compliance.  A new penal law (February 1990)
strengthened  the hand of the authorities in prosecuting  tax evasion  and fraud, mainly by reducing
the burden  of evidence  required before the Government  can proceed  with penalties. The General
Ahx  Board (DGI) has been granted the authority to close temporarily  the premises of enterprises
that fail to register for the VAT  or to issue invoices. As a result, business closures, which had
never been used in Argentina in a systematic  way until two years ago, rose fror  751 in 1990
to 5,021 in the first 9 months of 1991.
To increase the  capacity of  the  tax  administration, the  strategy  was to  enhance
simultaneously computerization and  human  resources  development.  The  administration
reactivated  its managerial capacities through actions in the areas of collection management,
audits and internal control, and personnel policy.  The effort of increasing the number of
audits, closures and detentions are summarized  in Table  4.
The  primary  functions of  tax  administration--facilitating  and  monitoring  taxpayer
compliance and  preventing taxpayer  non-compliance--have  until  recently  operated  very
13  Source: World Bank (1990) and defined as  the share in GDP of the
economic sectors  not exempted from payment of VAT.- 11  I
inefficiently. The tax roster was allowed  to deteriorate during most of the 1980s; additionar:',
data were collected  manually with a high percentage  of error.  In order to increase the efficiency
of tax collection, a new computer software  was developed  in  an increasingly  large number of
agencies. The tax authorities also attempted  to compensate  for the absence of automated systems
for collection and taxpayer  auditing  through several local initiatives, some of which had notable
success such as the lottery based on VAT  receipts that increased registration of transactions.
Legal modifications  have  allowed  more flexibility  in the application  of CAcal  secrecy,  permitting
DGI to publish in  newspapers lists of defaulting taxpayers, which has also curtailed fraud.
Finally, taxpayer compliance increased significantly  when a considerable simpliScation  of tax
forms was introduced in January 1992.
The low yield and high cost of taxpayer inspections  and audits have been a prominent
feature of Argentina's  tax administration  during the 1980s.'4  DGI management  proved unable
to generate from within the necessary  changes to improve productivity. Since 1989, however,
many of the problems  that plagued  the institutional  infrastructure  of tax administration  have  been
identified.  First, an extensive  audit of industrial promotion beneficiaries  was launched as well
a census of VAT  taxpayers. This operation  provided  an impressive  amount of information  about
potential taxpayers;  moreover,  the presence  of DGI officials  all over the country had a deterrent
impact  on VAT  noncompliance. Second, the strategy also focused  on the improvement  of DGI's
audit capacity.  This included  the development  of a computer program and the use of new tax
audit procedures for selected economic  firms in different sectors.  The administration  has been
able to  detect interruptions in the VAT  chain and to develop indicators of critical inputs to
estimate taxable bases.
For a long time, DGI management  was unable to plan or carry out reforms  to improve
productivity. Past union contracts  demanded  a flat compensation  curve, as well  as ensuring  job
security, which made it difficult for management  to improve the quality of the work force.
Qualified staff were difficult  to attract and retain, morale was low, and staff usually held more
than one job to compensate  for low wages. This was aggravated  by high turnover in the position
of Director General of DGI.  As part of the Government's  strategy,  a new general organizational
structure in line with modern managerial  concepts  was approved  in January 1992. At the same
14  Between  1986 and  1989, collected revenue per audit fell from US$126 to
US$34,  while the average cost per audit increased from US$278 to
US$838.- 12-
time, the remuneration,  career path, and other human resource issues of the proposed structure
were reviewed and embodied in a Collective Work Agreement.  This agreement eliminated
existing job  security and  modified the  excessively generous leave policy, but  established
incentive policies including promotion procedures to increase productivity.  Finally, training
recently has become  an area of concern for DGI.
3. CONCLUSION
Although the importance  of tax administration  reforms  is widely acknowledged  by those
concerned with  structural adjustment in  developing countries, the relationship between tax
administrative  changes  and tax revenue fluctuations  has received  little attention in the economic
literature. In this paper, we have  proposed  a simple approach  to measure this relationship. Tax
effort has been defined as the variation  in tax revenues that cannot be explained by the changes
in the Olivera-Thnzi  effect, in the potential tax base owing to the fluctuations  in the economic
environment,  and in tax rates.  The approach  has been applied to Argentina, but can be readily
applied to other countries as well.
The major results from the analysis can be summarized  as follows:
*  The administrative  dimension  of tax reform is at the center of the recent fiscal
adjustment in Argentina. Since 1991, tax effort is on average  80 percent higher
than during the precedent  (temporary)  successful  adjustment  episode in Argentina
(the Austral Plan).
*  An efficient  tax administration  and an improvement  in taxpayers  compliance
levels appear to precede rather than to follow tax revenues  increases.
*  Tax effort is influenced  significantly  by macrovariables  such as GDP growth
and inflation  as well as by the stability  of the political environment,  but little by
other fiscal variables such as alternative  sources of financing.
*  The increase in tax eflort is generally the result of reductions in legal tax
exemptions and in  tax  evasion.  The sequencing in  Argentina was, first, to
broaden the potential VAT  base, and, then, to reduce tax evasion  through higher- 13 -
tax penalties and improvements  of the  basic functions of  tax administration:
inspection  and audits, tax management,  and personnel policy.- 14-
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Bank Country Study, 1990.Table I - Increases In VAT Collection: Comparison  between  the Austral and Convertibility Plans
Austral  Convertibility
Plan  Plan
Variation in  a/:  (May 1985 - Sep 1986)  (Mar 1991  - Dec 1992)
Total  Monthly  Total  Monthly
Average  Average
VAT Collection (T)  52 73  3 10  108.04  4.91
Tax Effort (E)  31.85  1.87  74.04  3.37
Real GDP (Y)  4.70  0.28  15.32  0.70
Olivera-Tanzi  Effect  b/  16 18  0.95  6.90  0.31
Tax Rate (t)  0.00  0.00  11.78  0.54
a/  Calculated  as variations of natural logarithms, in percent.
b/  Measured  as the log variation of gross corrected GDP  growth and gross corrected inflation.Table 2 - Granger Causality Test  (Jan 1983 - Dec 1992)
Variable  E  E  VAT  VAT
constant  4.377  -2.736  -52.546  -11.182
(0.32)  (-.37)  (-1.39)  (-0.67)
E(-1)  0.424  0.411  0.416
(2.22)  (4.19)  (0.80)
E(-2)  0.311  0.373  0.623
(1.59)  (3.52)  (1.16)
E(-3)  40.060  0.071  -0.166
(-0.31)  (0.63)  (-31)
E(-4)  0.176  0.135  0.907
(0.89)  (1.20)  (1.69)
E(-5)  -0.119  -0.168  -1.118
(-0.62)  (-1.50)  (-2.11)
E(-6)  -0.0314  0.0785  -0.480
(-0.16)  (0.70)  (-0.88)
E(-7)  -0.0539  -0.045  -0.637
(-0.27)  (-0406)  (-1.19)
E(-8)  0.0472  0.109  0.788
(0.24)  (0.10)  (1.47)
E(-9)  0.2175  0.190  0.719
(1.15)  (1.83)  (1.39)
VAT(-1)  -0.007  0.466  0.623
(-0.I0)  (2.49)  (6.31)
VAT(-2)  0.030  0.258  0.403
(0.41)  (1.28)  (3.49)
VAT(-3)  0.049  0.143  -0.527
(0.66)  (0.71)  (-0.43)
'VAT(-4)  -0.036  -0.270  -0.305
(-0.50)  (-1.37)  (-0.25)
VAT(-5)  -0.028  0.146  -0.142
(-0.40)  (0.75)  (-1.20)
VAT(-6)  0.0461  0.333  0.298
(0.66)  (1.75)  (2.50)
VAT(-7)  0.002  0.081  -0.065
(0.03)  (0.42)  (-0.53)
VAT(-8)  -0.016  -0.351  -0.161
(-0.24)  (-1.87)  (-1.38)
VAT(-9)  -0.017  0.060  0.197
(-0.26)  (1.39)  (1.81)
R2= 0.79  R2= 0.79  R
2= 0.93  R
2 = 0.°2
DW=  2.00  DW=  2.00  DW=  1.93  DW=  1.92
RSS=  53571.7  RSS=  54396.5  RSS=  401350.5  RSS-  488537.4
N= 111  N=  111  N=  111  N=  111
F(9,93)=  0.16  F(9,93)=  2.25
Note: E is the monthly tax effort index and  VAT real value added tax revenues.  T statistics  are shcnvn  in
parenthesis.  R
2 is the explan uDry  pow/er  of the regression; DW is the Durbin-Aitson  Statistic; RSS is the residual
sum of squares  of the regressions;  N is the number of observtions.  F is a Fiaher test  of joint-significance of the
laed  terms of the independent variable.Table  3:  The Deterninants of Tax Effort. 1983-92
nInE  eInE  lInE  4InE
constant  -0.508  -0.338  -0.296  -0.152
(-2.75)  (-3.00)  (-2.66)  (-2.10)
in^(.1)  1.965  0.815  0.687  1.465
(5.50)  (3.12)  (2.74)  (4.93)
Growth(-I)  1.378  0.867  1.43c





POL  0.006  0.005  0.005
(1.55)  (2.37)  (2.17)
DUMI  0.357  0.251  0.237
(2.55)  (2,96)  (2.74)
DUM2  1.856  1.887
(7.65)  (7.61)
adjR'  0.518  0.833  0.824  0.439
DW  2.67  2.31  2.47  2.40
w#aere  iInE  is the percentage clhange in total tax effort, infl(-l)  lagged domestic inflation. Growth(-4) lagged GDP groAT/h,  nF(-J)  is changes
net externalfinancing, f1nM(-I)  is  changes in MI,  POL tihe  number  of months  betwveen  changes in Minister  of Economy, DUMI  a  dummy
variable  for  the period  of the Convertibility, and DUM2 a dummy variablefor  the third quarter of 1989 capturing the clange  of Administration.
Table 4:  Tax Administration, Indicators of Collection Effort (1987-92)
1987  1988  1989  1990  1?W  1992 a/
Collection  Orders  9,668  15,137  15,841  13,089  69,548  48,708
Control
Closures  0  0  0  751  8,157  32,000
Effective Closures  0  0  0  n.a.  5,466  17,184
Fines  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  40,933  nia.
Audits and Indictments
Indictments Initiated  20,903  33.770  25,286  39,138  179,452  n.a.
Indictments Pending  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  116,084  197,332
Internal and External Audits  25,955  21,310  13.864  20,845  4i,313  n.a.
Preventive Audits  n.a.  40,475  38,483  119,969  228,821  n.a.
A/  Estimates  based  on  first  quarter  of  1992  onLy.
Source:  DGI and  WorLd Bank  staff  estimates.OD
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The monthly series involved  in the estimation of tax effort are:
a)  Real VAT revenue (T), defined  as nominal  VAT collection  net of withdrawals, deflated
by the average combined price index.
b)  VAT rate (t), applied to general goods and servicesl/.
c)  Collection delay (0) which is the legal delay, defined as the ratio "days of legal
delay/days of period".
d)  The inflation rate (7r),  measured by the variation of the combined price index2/.
e)  Real GDP (Y).  Note that GDP data was only available  on a quarterly basis. It was
converted into a monthly series, using a monthly industrial  production index as a proxy
of economic  activity.
The above information was obtained from the Tax Administration Agency (DGI), the
Central Bank (ECRA) and the Institute of SLatistics  (IINJDEC).
In the main text (see Figure 2), we decided to present tax effort as an index, which was
constructed in  two  steps.  The monthly percentage change in  tax  effort3/  was estimated
following equation (5); the detailed results are shown in Table 1 of this appendix.  We then
calculated  the tax effon index (with base January of 1983=100) as follows:
E,+=  EXP [ LN(E,)  +  nLN(Et+,)]
The resulting  monthly index is presented in the last column of Table 1 of this appendix.  The
quarterly inde; in Figure 2 is the simple average of the monthly index.
The decomposition  of total tax effort into exemptions reduction effort and tax evasion
reductiorn  effort has been calculated by using the procedure described in the main text (see
section 2.4 and Figure 4).  The results are summarized  in Table 2 of this appendix. Again, we
chose to present them as indices, following  the methodology  described above.
1/  It is acknowledged  that otber rates apply to some goods and services, though these were not -tvailable  on
a detailed  basis throughout the period.
2/  This measure  of inflation is commonly  used in Argentina;  the combined  price index is the simple average
of the consumer  and wholesale  price indices.
3/  Measured as the variation  of -natural  logarithms.Table I -Argentina: Estimation of Total  Tax Effort Index (January 1983  - December  1992)
Log  Log  Log  Log  Log  Log  Log 
Change  in  Change  in  Change  in  Change  in  Change  in  u;hange  in  of  Tax Effort
Reul  VAT  Tax Rate  Ci rrecled  Gross  Corrected  Real  GDP  Tax  Efort  Tax Sfforl  Index
Collection  3DP Grovwh  Gross  Innation  Jan 83  =  100
Jan.83  *0.0089  0.0000  0.1071  0.0487  0 0401  0 1068  4.6052  100 00
Feb-83  .0.1813  0.0000  .0 .953  .0.0198  .0.2908  -0 3056  4.2995  73 66
Mar-83  -0.0461  0.0000  0.7282  .0.0225  0.3334  0,3262  4.6258  102.08
Apr-83  0.1159  0.0000  .0.5142  -0.0303  -0.1394  *0.3192  4.3066  74.19
May-83  0.2482  0.0000  0.2096  0.0184  0.0361  0.4371 i  4.7437  114.86
Jun-83  -0.1264  0.0000  -0.0084  0.0526  0.0288  0 1110  4.6327  102.79
Jul.83  0.0385  0.0000  -0.0929  -0.0315  0.0507  .00353  4.5974  99.23
Aug.83  -0.0671  0.0000  0.1081  0.0582  0.0419  0.0573  4 6548  105 08
Sep.83  .0.0461  0.0000  .0.0246  0.0531  0.0208  .0.0384  4.6164  101.13
Oct.83  0.1366  0.0000  -0.0020  -0.0604  0.0191  0.0552  4.6715  106.86
Nov.83  .0.0295  0.0000  0.0670  0.0028  0.0769  .0.0365  4 6350  103.03
Dec-83  -0.2056  0.0000  *0.2503  0.0105  0.1365  -0.3090  4.3260  75 64
Jan.84  .0.0221  0.0000  0.2171  0.0644  0.0481  0.0825  4 4085  82.14
Feb-84  -0.1403  0.0000  -0.3126  . 0448  .0.2157  -0.1924  4.2161  67.77
Mar-84  0.1719  0.0000  0.59R6  0.0266  0.2996  0.4975  4.7135  111.44
Apr.84  -0.240  0.0000  *0.4523  0.0019  -0.0939  -0.6106  4 1030  60.52
May-84  0.2778  0.0000  0.1232  -0.0406  0.0109  0.3495  4.4525  85.84
Jun-84  0.0082  0.0000  -0.0254  0.0500  -0.0109  0.0437  4 4962  89.67
Jul-84  0.0701  0.0000  .0.0139  0.0356  *0.0227  0.0434  4.5395  93.65
Aug-84  0.0146  0.0000  0.07iS  0 0544  0.0439  0.1027  4.6423  103.78
Sep-84  -0.2294  0.0000  -0.1217  i1.0321  -0.0603  .0 2586  4.3836  80 13
Oct-84  0.2301  0.0000  0.2654  -. 0835  0.i 691  0.2429  4.6266  102.16
Nov-84  .0.1355  0.0000  -0.2623  -0.0203  -0.0576  -0.3605  4.2661  71.24
Dec-84  -0.0274  0.0000  *0.0605  0.0678  -0 1088  0.0886  4.3547  77.84
Jan-85  -0.0716  0.0000  0.2447  0.0135  0.0981  0 0885  4.44i2  85.05
Feb.85  -0.1453  0.0000  -0.490'  -0.0358  .0.3011  -0.3705  4.0727  58.71
Mar-85  0.0882  0.0000  0.6936  0.0781  0.2730  0 5868  4.6595  105.58
Apr-85  -0.1870  0.0000  -0.3354  0.0309  -0.0131  -0.4783  4.1811  65.44
May-85  0.1624  0.0000  -0.0274  -0 0163  |  0 0358  0 1545  4.3357  76.38
Jurn-85  -0.1046  0.0000  -0.1214  0.0773  -0  351  -0.0135  4.3222  75.35
Jul-85  0.5324  0.0000  0.1306  -0 3559  -0.0282  0.3353  4.6574  105.37
Aug-85  -0.1561  0 0000  01115  0.0061  0.0650  -01036  4.5538  95.00
Sep-85  0.1902  0.0000  0.0280  -0.0116  0.0888  0.1179  4.6717  106.88
Oct-85  0.0311  0.0000  -0.0136  0.0009  0.0773  -0.0588  4 6129  100 78
Nov-85  0.0291  0.0000  -0.1212  0.0019  -0.0243  -0.0659  4.5471  94.35
Dec-85  -0.1537  0.0000  -0.0092  00054  |-00319  -0.1256 I  4 4214  83.21
Jan-86  -0.1637  0.0000  0.0922  -0.0077  0.0450  -0.1242  4.2972  73,50
Feb-86  0.3377  0.0000  -0.3654  -0.0002  -0.2525  0.2246  1  4.5218  92.00
Mar-86  *0.1836  0.0000  0.6248  00183  02673  01922  4.7140  11149
Apr.86  0.2640  0.0000  -0.3137  0.0115  -0.0005  -0.0378  4.6762  107.36
May.86  -J..1175  0.0000  0.0014  -0.0049  0.0007 '  -01217  4.5545  95,06
Jun.86  0.0560  0.0000  -0.1476  0.0148  -0.1207  0.0439  4.5984  99.33
Jul-86  -0.1252  0.0000  0.1997  040139  0 0443  0.0441  4.6425  103  80
Aug-86  -0.0199  0.0000  -0.0029  0 0368  0.0418  -0.0279  4.6146  100 94
Sep-86  0.1112  0.0000  -0.0379  -0.0236  0.0101  0.0396  4.6542  1  105.02
Oct-86  -0.0845  0.0000  0.1004  -0.0154  0.0946  -0.0940  4.5601  95.59
Nov-86  -0,2514  -0.1178  -0.1884  -0.0056  -0.0629  -0.2648  4.2953  73.36
Dec-86  -0.1635  0.0000  -0.0022  -0.0155  .0,0647  -01164  4 1789  65.29
Jan-87  0.4334  0.0000  0.1276  0.0169  0.0494  0.5285  4.7074  110.76
Feb-87  -0.6470  0.0000  .0.2954  0.0044  -0.2460  -06921  4.0153  5544
Mar.87  0.8675  0.0000  0.5639  00119  03179  1.1254  5.1407  170.83
Apr.87  -0.2713  0.0000  1  0.3927  -0.0519  .0.0749  1-06411  4 4496  89.98
May-87  r1,0743  0.0000  0.0613  0.0196  -0.0135  01688  4 6684  106.53
Jun-87  0.0432  0.0000  0.0470  0.0254  0.0334  0.0821  4.7505  11565
Jul-87  0.5363  0.0000  -0.0671  0.0227  -0.0337  0.525S  5.2761  195.60
Aug-87  -0.8336  0.0000  0.0070  0.0402  -00267  -0.7597  4.5163  91.50
Sep-87  0.1997  0.0000  0.0426  0.0023  0.0159  0.2288  4.7451  115.02
Oct-87  .0.2855  0,  00(2  O  0.0917  0.0947  0.1076  -0,2067  4.5384  93.54
Nov.87  0.0267  0.0000  -0.1663  -0.1651  -0.0588  -0.2459  4.2925  |  73.15
Dec-87  -0.0233  0.0000  0.0408 1  0.0378  -00179  -0.0024  4.2901  7297
continued-.Tabi.  I  - Argentina:  Estimation  of Total  Tax Effort  Index  (January  1983 - December  1992)
Log  Log  Log  Log  Log  Log  Log
Change in  Change in  Change in  Change in  Change in  Change in  of  Tax Effort
Real VAT  Tax Rate  Corrected Gross  Corrected  Real GDP  Tax Effort  Tax Effort  Index
Collection  GDP Growth  Gross Inflation  Jan 83 =  100
Jan-88  -0.1753  0.0000  -0.0015  0.0757  -0.0194  .0,0817  4.2084  67.25
Feh88  0 0188  0.0000  .0.1408  0.0121  .0.1601  0.0503  4.2587  70.72
Mar-88  0.0616  0.0000  0.4468  0.0304  0.2866  0.2521  4.5108  91.00
Apr.88  0.0646  0.0000  -0.4389  0.0116  -0.1523  -0.2205  4.2904  72.99
May-88  -0.1732  0.0000  0.2222  0.0274  0.0699  0.0065  4.2968  73.47
Jun.88  0.1641  0.0000  -0.1079  O.0120  -0.0380  0.1063  4.4032  81.71
JulP88  -0.1796  0.0000  -0.0132  0.0288  -0 0512  -0 1128  4.2904  73.00
Aug.88  .0.0733  0.0000  0.0411  0.0396  -0.01.02  0.0175  4.3079  74.29
Sep.88  -0.0721  -0 0645  -0.0603  .0.1845  .0.0604  -0.1819  4.1260  61.93
Oct-88  .0.1398  0.0000  0.1816  .0.0196  O.1?12  .0.0990  4.0269  56.09
Nov-88  0.3508  0.0000  -0.1119  .0.0158  0.0093  0.2138  4.2408  69.46
Dec-88  .0.0372  0.0000  .0.1002  0.0146  .0.0909  -0.0319  4.2089  67.28
Jan.89  -0.1795  0.0000  0.0691  0.0150  -0.0218  -0.0737  4.1352  62.50
Feb-89  -0.0374  0.0000  -0.0137  O.u1O7  -0.0355  -O.0049  4.1303  62.20
Mar-89  -0.0190  0.0000  0.2512  0.0816  0.2157  0.0981  4.2284  68.61
Apr-89  -1.5388  0.0000  .0.2916  0.2265  -0.0759  -1.5280  2.7004  14.89
May-89  *0.4622  0.0000  -0.0760  0.2753  -0.1519  -0.1110  2.5893  13.32
Jun-89  1.1492  0.0000  0.1624  041524  0.0104  1.4535  4.0429  56.99
Jul-89  0.4047  0.0000  -0.0443  0.2951  -0,0339  0.6893  4.7322  113.54
Aug-89  0.5549  0.0000  0.0831  -0.9562  0.0492  -0.3675  4.3647  78.63
Sep-89  0.1823  0.0000  -0.0350  -0.1114  0.0142  0.0216  4.3863  80.35
Oct-89  0.1400  0.0000  0.1009  -0 0184  0.1151  0 1074  4.4937  89.45
Nov-89  0.0904  0.0000  -0.1209  0.0060  -0.0058  -0.0187  4.4750  87.80
Dec-89  -0.3475  0.0000  -0.0309  0.3370  -0 0366  -0 0047  4.4703  87.38
Jan-90  -0.3263  -0.1431  0.0486  0.1477  0.0120  0.0011  4.4714  87.48
Feb-90  -0.1641  0.0000  -0.2137  0.0519  -0.2018  -0.1242  4.3472  77.26
Mar-90  0.5162  0.0000  0.2909  -0.2355  0.1709  0.4007  4 7478  115.34
Apr-90  0.3774  0.0000  -0.1347  -0.2930  -0.0934  0.0430  4.7909  120.40
May-90  0.1103  0.0000  0.0972  0.0059  0 1007  0.1127  4.9035  134.76
Jun-90  0.0357  0 0000  -0.0725  0.0020  -0 0423  0.0075  4.9110  135.78
Jul-90  0.0261  0.0000  -0.0261  -O 0Wcs  -0.0965  0.0785  4.9895  146.86
Aug-90  -0.1270  0.0000  0.1242  0.0450  0.1487  -0 1065  4.8830  132.03
Sep-90  -0.1362  0 0000  -0.0921  -0.0205  -0.0302  -0.2186  4.6644  106.10
Oct-90  0.2759  0.0000  0.0747  -0.0'  06  0.1161  0.1999  4.8644  129.59
Nov-90  0.1417  0.1823  -0.0663  -O.W059  -0.0133  -0 0996  4 7648  117.31
Dec-90  -0.2118  0.000"1  -0.0234  -0 0069  -0.0610  -0 1812  4.58S6  97 87
Jan-91  0.1058  0.0000  0.0805  0 0328  0.0985  0 1206  4.7042  110.41
Feb-91  -0.1775  0.0000  -0.1531  0 1073  -0.2171  -0.0062  4.6980  109.73
Mar-91  0.0745  0.0253  0.1474  -0.1332  0.1287  -O 0653  4 6328  102.80
Apr-91  0.3471  0.0000  -0 0677  -0 0065  -0.0705  0.3434  4.9761  144.91
May-91  0.0364  0.0000  0.0680  -0.0049  0.1296  -0 0301  4.9460  140.61
Jun-91  0.0059  0 0000  -0.0707  0 0006  -0.0789  0 0147  4.9607  142.69
Jul-91  0.0826  0.0000  0.0283  .0 0020  0.0080  0 1009  5.0615  157.83
Aug.91  0.0215  0.0000  1  0.0076  -0.0034  0.0305  -0 0048  5 0567  157.08
Sep-91  -0.0306  0.1178  -0.0121  0.0021  -0.0055  *0.1529  4.9038  134.81
Oct-91  0.2856  0.0000  0.0512  -0 0002  0 1413  0 1963  5 1001  164.04
Nov.91  -0.0886  0.0000  -0.0519  -0.0042  -0 0075  -0.1371  4.9630  143.02
Dec-91  0.0027  0.0000  -0.0163  0 0003  -0 0574  0 0442  5.0071  149.47
Jan-92  0.1324  0.0000  -0.0086  0.0064  -0.0845  0.2147  5.2218  185.27
Feb-92  -0.0865  O.. -00  -0.0248  -0 0015  -0 1656  0.0528  5.2  746  195.32
Mar-92  0.1826  0 0000  0.1436  0.0015  0.2523  0.0754  5.3500 . 210  e2
Apr-92  0.1689  0.0000  -0.0910  -0.0036  0.0009  0 0734  5 4235  226 66
May-92  0.0172  0.0000  -0.0007  -0.0012  -0.OC12  0 0165  5 4399  230 42
Jun-92  0.0024  0.0000  0.0157  0.0014  0.0453  -0.0257  5.4142  224.57
Jul-92  0.0543  0.0000  -0.0101  0.0019  0.0156  0 0305  5 4447  231.52
Aug-92  0.0251  0.0000  -0.0043  -0.0009  0.0027  00172  5.4619  235.54
Sep-92  -0.0645  0.0000  0.0063  -0.0007  0.0215  -00805  5.3814  217.33
Oct-92  0.0660  0.0000  -00037  .0.0004  00106  0.0512  54326  228.75
Nov-92  -0.0257  0.0000  -0.0088  0.0044  -0.0159  -0 0229  5 4097  223  56
Dec-92  -0.0552  0.0000  -0.0007  0.0014  -0.0180  -0 0365  5.3732  21554Table 2  - Argeritina: Composition  of Total Tax Effort (July 1989  - December  1992)
Total Tax  Tax Evasion  Exemptions  Reduction
Effort Index  Effort Index  Effort Index
(July  1989 =  100)  (July 1989 = 100)  (July 1989 =  100)
Jul-89  100.00  100.00  100.00
Aug-89  69.25  69.25  100.00
Sep-89  70.76  70.76  100.00
Oct-89  78.78  78.78  100.00
Nov-89  77.32  77.32  100.00
Dec-89  76.96  76.96  100.00
Jan-90  77.04  77.04  100.00
Feb-90  68.05  54.23  125.48
Mar-90  101.58  80.95  125.48
Apr-90  106.04  81.70  129.79
May-90  118.69  91,45  129.79
Jun-90  119.58  92.14  129.79
Jul-90  129.34  99.66  129.79
Aug-90  116.28  89.59  129.79
Sep-90  93.45  72.00  129.79
Oct-90  114.13  87.94  129.79
Nov-90  103.32  66.80  154.66
Dec-90  86.20  55.73  154.66
Jan-91  97.24  62.88  154.66
Feb-91  96.64  62.49  154.66
Mar-91  90.54  58.36  155.13
Apr-91  127.63  82.27  155.13
May-91  123.84  79.83  155.13
Jun-91  1  25.67  81.01  155.13
Jul-91  139.01  89.61  155.13
Aug-91  138.34  89.17  155.13
Sep-91  118.73  76.53  155.13
Oct-91  144.48  93.13  1.35.13
Nov-91  125.96  81.19  155.13
Dec-91  131.65  84.86  155.13
Jan-92  163.18  105.18  155.13
Feb-92  172.02  109.88  156.55
Mar-92  185.49  118.49  156.55
Apr-92  199.63  127.52  156.55
May-92  202.94  129.63  156.55
Jun-92  197.78  126.34  156.55
Jul-92  203.90  130.25  156.55
Aug-92  207.44  132.51  156.55
Sep-92  191.41  122.26  156.55
Oct-92  201.47  128.69  156.55
Nov-92  196.90  125.77  156.55
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